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Summary. 
 
The Oslo Accords and the successor Road Map were based on assumptions about 
state formation in Palestine that proved to be false. By not responding to the changing 
facts on the ground donors contributed to the catastrophic decline in the unity of the 
Palestinian liberation movement and the collapse in the legitimacy of its secular wing. 
It is critical that donors recognize the interdependence of Oslo and the state formation 
crisis in Palestine, and recognize that Palestine has now reached a state of indefinite 
transition which is likely to last for a long time. It is vital to take a step back from 
policies which presume that a Palestinian state is just round the corner and focus on 
programmes appropriate for a long transition when Palestinians will effectively 
remain under Israeli occupation.  
 
Contemporary thinking about state viability has been driven by a focus on building 
functional capabilities of states and has ignored the fundamental importance of 
legitimacy and its two-way relationship with effectiveness. Legitimacy in the 
Palestinian case is even more complicated because a Palestinian state did not exist and 
a liberation leadership was attempting to achieve independence and sovereignty while 
managing an authority with limited self-governance rights. The Oslo Accords were 
based on the assumption that Israel’s self-interest would rapidly result in the creation 
of a viable Palestinian state. But the Accords bound the Palestinians to agreements 
which significantly reduced their bargaining power vis-à-vis Israel and allowed the 
creation of new Israeli facts on the ground after the signing of the Accords. This 
resulted in a vicious cycle of diminishing legitimacy of the Palestinian leadership, 
their diminishing ability to deliver vital ‘state’ functions like security, which in turn 
allowed Israel to create further facts on the ground and increase its bargaining power 
in the next round of negotiations. The ultimate result was the rupture of the 
Palestinian movement in 2007-8, an event whose long-term implications we have 
probably yet to fully appreciate. 
 
In this context, the most responsible strategy for donors is to support enabling 
conditions for the Palestinian economy and polity during a long period of ‘transition’ 
when the occupation will continue. The UN concept of ‘larger freedoms’ allows us to 
frame an alternative agenda. Ensuring the freedom from want should now focus on 
long-term Palestinian coping strategies. The freedom from fear now requires not just 
policing but a political process that provides hope for the future and this requires a 
Palestinian debate about credible strategies of liberation. Finally, the freedom to live 
in dignity requires a focus on domestic and international mobilizations to protect 
Palestinian political and civil rights. 
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1. Background 
The devastating Israeli attacks on Gaza beginning in December 2008 have shattered 
any remaining complacency about the feasibility of the route to a Palestinian state 
established by the Oslo Accords. After more than fifteen years of negotiations without 
any end game, Palestinians have paid a very heavy price in lost lives and severe 
economic hardship. Yet the Oslo Accords signed between 1993 and 1995 had been 
the source of considerable optimism at the time. Many Palestinians hoped that a 
Palestinian state with legitimate borders and true sovereignty would follow, even if it 
was based only on the occupied territories of 1967. Israel’s response to the Accords 
was so unexpected that analysis took some time to catch up with what was happening. 
Instead of withdrawing from the territories and encouraging economic integration 
with Israel, Israel penetrated further into the territories with new settlements and set 
up multiple barriers to the movement of people and goods that undermined the 
integration that already existed. After fifteen years, it is clear that these developments 
were not accidents or temporary aberrations. The present impasse has a lot to do with 
structural weaknesses in the Oslo process and the constraints it set on the interim 
authority that was set up under its auspices (Khan, et al. 2004).  
 
Despite these constraints, the Palestinian Authority (also referred to by many 
Palestinians as the Palestinian National Authority) was for a time quite successful in 
attracting expatriate investment and converting aid flows into infrastructure. This 
resulted in an initial period of moderately high growth. Between 1995 and 1999 
growth averaged 6 per cent a year (World Bank 2008: 3). In reality this figure is 
exaggerated by two years of double-digit growth in 1997 and 1998 and by 1999 
growth was already coming under increasing strain (Khan 2004: Table 1.1). The 
second Intifadah in 2000 allowed Israel to fully activate its newly constructed system 
of checkpoints and controls that choked the Palestinian territories into a large number 
of disconnected patches. Not surprisingly, Palestinian incomes collapsed precipitately 
(World Bank 2004). After a moderate recovery in 2004 and 2005, another precipitate 
collapse began after the Hamas electoral victory of 2006. Gaza was blockaded, 
besieged, bombed and finally invaded.  
 
Not surprisingly, Palestinian per capita incomes in 2008 were a third lower than in 
1999, with effective unemployment in the region of 26 per cent in the West Bank and 
36 per cent in the Gaza Strip (World Bank 2008: 3). The official poverty rate in the 
West Bank was 19.1 per cent in 2007 and 51.8 per cent in Gaza: the figures after the 
2008 war on Gaza can only be imagined (World Bank 2008: 3). While the siege of 
Gaza has been devastating, the 723.3 km Separation Barrier that carves into vital 
territories of the West Bank and separates East Jerusalem from the West Bank is 
roughly two-thirds complete. According to the UN Coordinator for Humanitarian 
Assistance, there were 609 barriers to the movement of goods and people within the 
West Bank in 2008 (World Bank 2008: 2). The continued Israeli land grab has also 
been given an indeterminate degree of legitimacy by the Bush administration in the 
2004 Bush ‘letter of guarantees’ to Sharon. Not surprisingly, the legitimacy of Oslo 
and the mainstream Palestinian leadership committed to these agreements is at its 
lowest ebb. The chances of a viable Palestinian state have never looked so distant.  
 
The vagueness of the end-game in the Oslo Accords made it easy for both sides to 
sign on in the first place. But it also doomed the outcome because it is now clear that 
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the parties envisaged quite different outcomes in the medium to long term. There is 
now considerable evidence that Israel was willing to concede at best Palestinian self-
government with limited sovereignty. In particular on issues of border control, control 
over military capabilities, security, international treaties and even trade, Israel clearly 
intended to have a long-term say in Palestinian internal affairs. Its conditional 
withdrawal and ‘disengagement’ from parts of the West Bank and eventually from 
Gaza was consistent with this understanding. However, from the Palestinian 
perspective (and under international law) there is a wide gulf between disengagement 
and independence. Even a significant withdrawal from the West Bank with Israel 
controlling internal military roads and the Jordan border would essentially create a 
series of Gaza-like enclaves in the West Bank and not a sovereign Palestinian state. 
Not surprisingly, Israel’s vagueness on critical issue like control over the West Bank 
aquifers, the Jordan border, military roads within the West Bank, and of course the 
settlement blocks and Jerusalem remain sources of bitterness on the Palestinian side.  
 
At the same time, the Palestinian state-building strategy supported by donors and the 
‘international community’ had features that proved to be deeply destructive for the 
legitimacy of the Palestinian Authority and its secular leadership. First, the Palestinian 
leadership had to publicly abandon all of its bargaining power against Israel before 
Israel had conceded any specific Palestinian demands. In particular it had to guarantee 
Israeli security, recognize Israel and commit itself to the two-state solution before 
Israel had recognized any substantive Palestinian rights let alone a Palestinian state. 
The effect was to significantly increase Israel’s already dominant bargaining position 
and led to further annexations of territories and expansions of settlements in the West 
Bank that the Palestinian Authority had no capacity to resist.  
 
Secondly, the Authority had to demonstrate attributes of a state before it was a state, 
in particular before it had the legitimate monopoly of violence over a defined territory. 
The list of requisite attributes gradually grew to include accountability, the effective 
control of corruption, delivery of development outcomes and in particular the 
provision of internal security and security to its ‘neighbour’ Israel. But if these 
functions could be provided without a state, why did the Palestinians need a state 
except in a cosmetic sense? By not asking deeper questions about what a legitimate 
and sovereign state means, international facilitators inadvertently contributed to the 
collapse in the legitimacy of the mainstream Palestinian leadership. It is not surprising 
that by the time of the Camp David talks in 2000, there was virtually no trust 
remaining on either side (La Guardia 2007: 291-301).  
 
The failure of Camp David and the beginning of the second intifada marked the 
beginning of the collapse of the Oslo process. In 2003 a beleaguered Arafat was made 
to accept a new power-sharing arrangement with a prime minister, in a move that was 
intended to allow Israel to negotiate with the apparently more flexible Abu Mazen and 
bypass Arafat. But Abu Mazen only lasted a few months in power and resigned 
because he felt he had been betrayed by all sides, not least the Americans who failed 
to put pressure on Israel to stop pre-emptive attacks and assassinations of Palestinian 
leaders. Arafat’s death in 2004 removed the one Palestinian leader with sufficient 
legitimacy across enough sections of the Palestinian people to have made a credible 
peace with Israel.  
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The outcome of the 2006 elections reflected deep Palestinian disappointment with the 
limited progress towards sovereignty and the significant negative outcomes due to 
encirclement and containment after a decade of negotiations. Hamas won 74 seats in 
the legislative body against Fatah’s 45, securing a comfortable majority in the 132 
seat legislative council. But now outside powers tried to isolate the Hamas Prime 
Minister and his government while continuing to deal with the Fatah President. This 
contributed to growing conflicts between Palestinian factions and the rupture of June 
2007 when the Gaza Strip was effectively delinked from the West Bank by an armed 
Hamas takeover. Even compared to the limited trappings of the ‘semi-state’ 
constructed under Oslo, the Palestinian people currently face steadily growing 
‘statelessness’. The future prospects of Palestinian state-building have to be revisited 
in this context and the legacy of Oslo reconsidered.  
 
Section 2 proposes a framework for assessing the viability of a state and the 
legitimacy of a liberation movement. The Palestinian movement is based both in an 
embryonic quasi-state, the Palestinian Authority, but it is also essentially a liberation 
movement that is still struggling to achieve its fundamental national rights. In both 
arenas, there are complex interdependent relationships between legitimacy and 
effectiveness. We argue that the crisis of legitimacy and the fragmentation of the 
Palestinian polity as a result of Oslo cannot be understood without looking at these 
two arenas together.  
 
Section 3 looks at how Oslo changed the nature of the Palestinian movement and 
affected its legitimacy by not being able to ensure a legitimate outcome. The Oslo 
process was based on the assumption that a particular set of negotiating principles 
where the Palestinians gave up critical bargaining power in advance could lead to a 
settlement of the conflict through the creation of a viable Palestinian state. In the 
absence of any credible sanctions on Israel, this expectation was based on three sets of 
interdependent assumptions about Israeli strategic objectives, the likely effect of 
Palestinian capacity-building in specific areas and the likely effect of external 
involvement in the process. The interdependence of these assumptions meant that if 
one or more of these assumptions were false, the persistence of policy in a particular 
direction had the effect of making things worse.  
 
Section 4 draws together the analysis of the previous two sections to show how the 
Oslo process resulted in putting the mainstream Palestinian movement into a 
cumulative vicious cycle of declining legitimacy and effectiveness. The effect was to 
also fragment Palestinian society and its polity. The current dire situation is in terms 
of this analysis neither accidental nor temporary but a manifestation of a deeper 
structural problem. The mainstream leadership is likely to find it very difficult to 
extricate itself from the trap it finds itself in not only because of its own commitment 
to a particular course, but also because of its financial and political dependence on 
external supporters of this peace process. The irony is that external powers have 
damaged and are continuing to damage the secular mainstream Palestinian leadership 
by not understanding the implications of their policies, and not fully understanding 
the requirements of creating a legitimate and therefore viable solution to the conflict. 
We argue that it is imperative for Palestinian and international supporters of a viable 
peace to recognize that Palestine is trapped in a state of indefinite transition where 
feasible solutions will take time to construct, and where moreover, the immediate 
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priority is to reconstruct the fragmented Palestinian society and polity. Without this 
work no feasible solution is possible.  
 
Section 5 is the concluding section. It draws out the implications of this analysis for 
the Palestinian political process and for donors. It argues that the only responsible 
way to address the crisis is to recognize its deep roots and structural nature, much of it 
the outcome of ill-conceived aspects of the Oslo process. The United Nations’ 
recognition of the importance of ‘larger freedom’ and the attention it draws to the 
interdependence of economic and political freedoms provides a framework for 
identifying immediate tasks for social reconstruction and development in Palestine. 
The principle of Freedom from Want in a context of indefinite transition draws our 
attention to the urgency of developing alternative coping strategies that will allow 
Palestinian populations to survive long periods of encirclement and containment. The 
principle of Freedom from Fear in this context suggests that a simple emphasis on 
policing is insufficient. The depth of the breakdown in the Palestinian polity suggests 
that space and opportunity have to be created for Palestinians to discuss and construct 
more credible strategies of liberation. We refer to some interesting work that has 
already begun along these lines and argue that this will be an important priority for all 
parties to support if Palestinian society is not to collapse into even more dangerous 
desperation and acts of violence. Finally, the Freedom to Live in Dignity is likely to 
emerge as one of the most important areas where the international community has a 
responsibility to support local and international campaigns to recognize and protect 
the civil and political rights of Palestinians during a prolonged and certainly indefinite 
transition period. A combination of policies and interventions along all these fronts 
will be necessary to halt and to begin to reverse the cumulative decline that 
Palestinian politics and development is confronting. 
  
2. A Framework for Assessing Progress in Palestinian State Formation 
The hybrid Palestinian Authority created as a result of the Oslo Accords sat unhappily 
in the grey area between a liberation movement and a state. The international 
community consistently failed to recognize the implications of its dual nature. This 
failure played a significant role in the gradual but eventually catastrophic collapse in 
the legitimacy of the Palestinian Authority. A liberation movement has to bargain 
with a colonial occupier to achieve sovereignty on the best possible terms. 
Historically, these have never been very polite negotiations about the details of when 
and how freedom should be granted. Colonial powers and occupiers have only 
conceded freedom to a subject population when faced with significant costs for 
continuing an occupation. A state, on the other hand, once it achieves a monopoly of 
violence over a defined territory, has a very different set of requirements for 
maintaining its viability. Its viability now depends primarily on its success in 
satisfying the economic and social requirements of its core constituencies.  
 
Much of the literature on state failure has looked at technocratic functions that a state 
has to perform to maintain its effectiveness and thereby remain viable. This 
understanding has informed a lot of state-building initiatives in Palestine and 
elsewhere. But this literature has typically ignored the ways in which legitimate 
authority (or sovereignty) is essential for the effective performance of any state 
functions, and the political conditions underpinning the creation and maintenance of 
sovereignty in different contexts. The obvious limitations of ignoring these issues 
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have become painfully apparent in places like Iraq and Afghanistan where attempts by 
external powers to construct viable states have been undermined by the failure of 
these states to achieve legitimate authority and therefore effectiveness, despite the 
expenditure of significant resources on security and technical capacity building. Not 
surprisingly, a number of analysts have begun to point out that these failures cannot 
be understood without looking at the role of the outside powers themselves in 
undermining the legitimacy of the states they were trying to construct (Ghani, et al. 
2005; Woodward 2006; Sogge 2008).  
 
A liberation struggle is similar in that it has to ‘deliver’ liberation and its effectiveness 
in this struggle also depends on its legitimacy. But clearly, liberation is a different 
game and success here depends on the ability of a leadership to mobilize against the 
colonial power to end the occupation rapidly and on the best possible terms. In a 
hybrid case where a national leadership is trying to lead both a liberation movement 
as well administering limited areas as an embryonic state, the interaction of the 
conditions of legitimacy in its two roles is problematic and need to be properly 
understood, particularly by external powers. In the case of the Palestinian Authority, 
the persistent confusion of its status as embryonic state and its status as liberation 
movement has had disastrous consequences for the legitimacy of the mainstream 
Palestinian leadership in both arenas: both in leading the national movement and as 
the body governing limited territories with limited sovereignty.  
 
To explore these contradictions we begin by looking separately at some of the 
linkages between legitimacy and capabilities in a state and a liberation movement. We 
then explore the dual aspect of the Palestinian leadership as leaders of a national 
liberation movement and leaders of a quasi-state to explain why the Oslo process has 
had such damaging consequences for the Palestinian secular leadership and its overall 
legitimacy in Palestinian society. The Palestinian case is perhaps the most extreme 
example of a failure of an externally sponsored state formation process because here 
there was not even a state, but a hybrid ‘authority’ that was also negotiating for the 
achievement of a state. 
 
State Functions and State Viability  
There is clearly a two-way relationship between the functions a state performs and its 
legitimacy. In this two-way relationship, the technical-bureaucratic capability of a 
state to perform critical functions is essential if its legitimacy is to be sustained. On 
the other hand, the effective performance of these functions requires not just 
bureaucratic capabilities but also political legitimacy and the authority to enforce the 
requisite rules and rights. The viability of a state ultimately depends on its legitimacy 
and authority, because without these a state cannot achieve a monopoly of violence or 
the capacity to enforce the critical rights and rules that are necessary for its economy 
and polity. Some of the important relationships between state functions and its 
viability are shown in Figure 1. 
 
 7
  C: Legitimacy and authority required for fun
ctiona
l eff
ecti
ven
ess
     
     
    B
: Ch
oice
 of fu
nctions ca
n enhance or damage legitimacy 
State Functions
Security, Economic 
Development, Political 
Stability
State Viability
Legitimacy and Effective 
Authority 
(Sovereignty)
A: Delivery provides  legitimacy
But requires technical-bureucratic 
capabilities (Contemporary focus)
 
Figure 1: Relationships between State Functions and State Viability  
 
A state is viable if it has the legitimate and effective authority to enforce the rules and 
rights required for economic development and political stability. At the minimum it 
has to enforce a monopoly of legitimate violence over a defined territory. A state with 
these characteristics is sovereign and is likely to be ‘viable’ because it has the 
requisite enforcement capabilities for achieving viability. The critical enforcement 
capabilities are obviously based on some functional capabilities that are therefore 
essential for a state to be legitimate. But which functions are critical? A state can only 
be legitimate if its functional priorities are acceptable to a broad range of significant 
social constituencies. A focus on the ‘wrong’ set of functional priorities can damage 
legitimacy rather than enhance it. And this is important, because legitimacy is also 
essential for the effectiveness with which functional capabilities are translated into 
actual outcomes.  
 
The multiple relationships between a state’s capabilities and its sovereignty/viability 
are shown in Figure 1. Contemporary interventions to strengthen state viability in 
developing countries have mainly focused on a single direction of causality shown by 
Arrow A in Figure 1. State-building has focused on strengthening the bureaucratic-
technical capabilities of states to perform functions deemed to be essential. Analysis 
in this area has sought to identify the essential ‘functions’ that a viable state has to 
perform, functions like the provision of security, a rule of law, public goods of 
different types, or institutions for holding executives to account. The assumption has 
been that these essential capabilities give the state its legitimacy, thereby enhancing 
its viability. The typical policy message has been to focus on bureaucratic and 
technical capacity building (security training, provision of equipment, funding for 
health care). However, donor assistance for state-building through this route has often 
achieved rather poor results, often because other, more important sources of 
legitimacy and sovereignty were ignored. 
 
First, Arrow B in Figure 1 shows that the choice of state capabilities that are 
prioritized is always a political choice, and these choices are likely to affect the 
legitimacy of the state system. The selection of particular capabilities for functions 
that the state should prioritize can affect the legitimacy of the state leadership. These 
decisions are nominally made by the political leadership of a country, which includes 
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opposition parties with a realistic chance of forming alternative coalitions. But the 
problem in many countries is that ruling coalitions are unable to connect with the 
needs of a sufficient number of powerful domestic constituencies to give them 
legitimacy and effective authority. Sometimes the problem may be with the identity of 
the coalitions competing for power, but often it is because the priorities and policies 
of all potential ruling coalitions are influenced by foreign powers on which domestic 
elites are financially or militarily dependent. In some extreme cases (which include 
Palestine) foreign powers may refuse to accept elected leaderships whose priorities 
are significantly at variance with their own, thereby directly determining acceptable 
priorities for any state leadership.  
 
It is easy to see how the choice of capabilities and policies to prioritize can potentially 
damage the legitimacy and effective authority of a state leadership. If credible or 
feasible alternative leaderships are not available, the legitimacy and sovereignty of the 
state as a whole can be affected. For instance: questions like security for whom and on 
what terms, what type of economic development, which services to provide and for 
whom never have politically neutral answers. Nor can these questions be answered in 
abstract by analysts looking at the interests of the ‘people’. Legitimacy is based on a 
more subtle requirement: the functions and priorities of a state have to be consistent 
with the distribution of political values, organizations and aspirations in a country. As 
a result, the prioritization of what appears to be ‘reasonable’ bureaucratic capabilities 
may damage rather than enhance the viability of a state: reducing its legitimacy and 
therefore its effective authority.  
 
The damaging effects of particular capacity building and service delivery programmes 
on state legitimacy can emerge through a number of different mechanisms. The most 
obvious set of problems emerge when donors get frustrated with the slow progress of 
‘reasonable’ service delivery goals and the tax collection required to finance these 
services and begin to support non-state agencies for delivering these services or they 
get directly involved themselves. Shifting financial support towards NGOs or directly 
monitoring requisite governance outcomes can appear to be obvious ways of 
bolstering the quality of life of citizens and thereby the legitimacy of a state. In 
reality, as Ghani, et al. (2005) point out, the result can be a decline in the legitimacy 
and sovereignty of the state. The state can also lose a sense of urgency in generating 
resources for itself and therefore engaging in the difficult politics of negotiating social 
contracts with powerful tax-paying constituencies. A state without this vital link to its 
people becomes simply a bureaucracy sustained in part by foreign taxpayers and can 
begin to lose its best people to the NGO sector, and so on. Thus, an attempt to develop 
capabilities for service delivery that appear to be important (such as health or 
education) could be ignoring the possibility (Arrow B) that the method of determining 
and executing these priorities may inadvertently damage rather than assist the 
development of sovereignty.  
 
An even more serious set of problems along Arrow B are identified by Woodward 
(2006) and Sogge (2008). External powers assisting state-building typically have their 
own political and economic priorities and agendas. We should not expect external 
powers spending their taxpayers’ money to be exclusively motivated by altruistic 
motives. The security arrangements, economic treaties and political alliances that 
external powers are trying to promote in assisted countries are not likely to be 
‘neutral’ in every sense. External powers have regional and global interests that may 
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not be shared by powerful constituencies within the country being assisted. For 
instance, external advice and state building assistance that prioritizes security 
capabilities to fight a particular insurgency, or assists in the privatization of critical 
assets, or results in particular economic treaties, may resonate very differently with 
significant local constituencies. Whether these attempts at state-building result in the 
achievement of a legitimate state depends on how internal politics interfaces with the 
interests of external powers.  
 
If the constituencies whose interests have been thwarted nevertheless perceive that 
they will achieve other important goals through the outside assistance, state building 
may still succeed. If powerful constituencies feel they are permanently going to lose 
out, their opposition over time can result in a decline or collapse in the legitimacy of 
the domestic state despite the expenditure of considerable external resources. It is 
likely that negative effects of this type followed external assistance to construct states 
in countries like Afghanistan and Iraq, and to strengthen states in countries like 
Pakistan. In each of these cases, powerful constituencies opted out of the state-
building or state-strengthening strategies because they perceived their interests would 
be permanently thwarted. We would surmise that till political strategies evolve to give 
these excluded political interests important stakes in determining priorities and 
policies, legitimacy in state-building in these cases will remain elusive.  
 
Though the Palestinian case was different, in particular because the Authority was not 
a state, the prioritization of security capabilities focusing on providing security to the 
occupying power eventually had very damaging effects on the legitimacy of the 
Palestinian Authority leadership. External powers insisted that the Palestinians focus 
on security-related state functions but failed to pin down Israel to any particular end-
game. When this strategy resulted in Israel using its enhanced bargaining power to 
impose even more limited concepts of what was on offer to the Palestinians, the 
legitimacy of the mainstream Palestinian leadership suffered very seriously. The loss 
of legitimacy manifested itself in its declining capacity to exercise authority and 
ultimately in its electoral defeat. As the mainstream leadership was associated with 
the state-building project, its loss of support was also an implicit vote on the 
legitimacy of the quasi-state as a whole, the Palestinian Authority.  
 
Finally, Arrow C in Figure 1 shows a further feedback from the legitimacy of a state 
to its capacity to perform functions. This feedback is of very great significance. A 
state requires legitimate authority to effectively perform any of its functions. The 
important point here is that the ability of a state to perform any of its functions 
requires a capacity to implement, which in turn requires legitimate authority. For 
instance, the most basic function of a state is to achieve a monopoly of violence. But 
regardless of how many policemen it has, this is impossible on a sustained basis if its 
authority is not legitimate. At a lower level, its ability to collect taxes, provide 
services, regulate the economy and the polity all become implausible if the state’s 
legitimate authority is weak or absent. Authority that is legitimate is simply 
sovereignty. Unfortunately, external powers often do not understand or care much 
about the internal political settlement that has to underpin legitimacy and effective 
authority in developing countries. 
 
If an inappropriate choice of functional priorities reduces the legitimacy of a state 
(along arrow B), this can therefore further reduce its capability to effectively deliver 
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even in the areas it has prioritized (along arrow C). And a decline in its effectiveness 
to provide prioritized functions (for instance in providing security or other vital public 
goods) can then result in further reductions in its legitimacy. We can then rapidly 
enter a vicious cycle of declining legitimacy and effectiveness if arrows B and C 
begin to feed into each other. This type of cumulative causation can explain why the 
viability of a state can rapidly collapse. If state-building fails to improve the 
legitimate authority of a state, or even worse if it begins to damage its legitimacy, the 
capacity of the state to perform vital functions is affected regardless of its 
bureaucratic-technical capacities, with possible cumulative effects on its legitimacy.  
 
Vicious cycles are paradoxically most likely in developing countries that are 
unfortunate enough to receive extensive support from external powers. If the 
consequence is that the security strategies and economic policies of the assisted state 
appear to be (or actually are) aligned with the priorities and interests of external 
powers in ways that damage the interests of powerful domestic constituencies, the 
domestic legitimacy and authority of the state and its political elites may precipitously 
collapse. This can then result in a further worsening of the security and economic 
situation, and prompt even more extensive involvement of external powers in the 
internal politics and economics of the country.  
 
None of these observations means that building bureaucratic and technical capabilities 
is unimportant. But unless the assistance on technical capabilities fits in with a viable 
political programme of a legitimate leadership whose priorities and policies have 
broad support, these investments are likely to either fail or make matters worse. But if  
Arrows B and C are working in a virtuous cycle (legitimate leaderships identifying 
priorities that further enhances their legitimacy); assistance along Arrow A can 
significantly assist a state-building programme. Unfortunately, significant and lasting 
examples of such disinterested support from external sponsors of state-building are 
hard to find. 
 
Liberation Movements and Legitimacy  
For the Palestinian state leadership, the issue of legitimacy is more complicated 
because the Authority was not a state, despite its trappings of flag cars and passports, 
and a number of other benefits conferred to a few key members of the leadership. 
Liberation movements are not sovereign and cannot perform many state-like 
functions. Nevertheless, there are parallels. A liberation movement is defined by its 
strategies of liberation, and these strategies both confer legitimacy to the leadership, 
and require legitimacy to carry out. And the immediate ‘delivery’ of these strategies is 
in terms of tactical struggles with the occupier, which can directly enhance the 
legitimacy of the movement, or otherwise. But as with a state, the long-run viability 
of a liberation movement depends on the legitimacy of its strategies of liberation, 
rather than immediate successes or failures in ‘delivery’. The parallel relationships 
between strategies of liberation and legitimacy in the case of a national movement are 
shown in Figure 2.  
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Figure 2 National Liberation Movements and the Issue of Legitimacy  
 
Arrow A in Figure 2 shows that an important contributor to the legitimacy of the 
leadership is their ongoing tactical performance in converting liberation strategies into 
success. This is equivalent to Arrow A in Figure 1 where a state achieves legitimacy 
by demonstrating its capacity to perform vital functions. As with states, Arrow B 
shows that the legitimacy of the leadership of a liberation movement depends 
fundamentally on the political acceptability of their strategic choices given the 
perceptions, values and ideologies of important national constituencies. Finally, 
legitimacy is if anything even more important for the pursuit of effective strategies in 
this case, shown by Arrow C, because engagement in conflict can call for significant 
sacrifices by many people over long periods. 
 
Legitimacy is thus a critical part of the processes described in both Figure 1 and 
Figure 2. The interdependence of the legitimacy of the Palestinian leadership on two 
different processes became a core problem in Palestinian state-building after the 
adoption of the Oslo process. The dual role of the Palestinian leadership suggests why 
the insistence by outside powers on a particular set of priorities for Palestinian 
capability-building had even more damaging effects on the legitimacy of this 
leadership than would otherwise have been the case. The perception within significant 
sections of the Palestinian population that the Oslo process was undermining the 
bargaining power of the Palestinian leadership in its national liberation movement 
served to undermine its legitimacy in the liberation movement. This loss of legitimacy 
in the context of a liberation struggle magnified the effects of legitimacy loss that 
might otherwise have happened if the Palestinian Authority was a fully fledged state. 
But once legitimacy began to drain away in this arena, this affected the operation of 
the Authority with cumulative negative effects on its performance.  
 
There were several aspects of the de facto ‘liberation’ strategy under Oslo that could 
explain the gradual loss of legitimacy of the Palestinian leadership that was charged 
with negotiating liberation through this route. First, as we have already indicated, the 
prioritization of security and the Palestinian pre-commitment to the two-state solution 
reduced the bargaining power of the Palestinian side because external powers did 
virtually nothing to rein in Israeli ability to create new facts on the ground. This 
would not have been very serious if progress towards a two-state solution on 1967 
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borders had been rapidly achieved. But when the result of Oslo was the deepening of 
Israeli settlement activity, the construction of new military roads and the construction 
of new checkpoints at border crossings and within the territories occupied in 1967, 
questions began to arise about the Oslo strategy in its entirety.  
 
Secondly, the collapse of legitimacy may perhaps have been halted if the Palestinian 
leadership had managed to delink itself from Oslo. But in fact, the Palestinian 
leadership increasingly behaved like international bureaucrats, continuing their 
negotiations while enjoying privileged lifestyles funded by foreign money. Foreign 
inflows not only financed the salaries of the leadership, by 1999 roughly twenty per 
cent of the working population of the occupied territories were employees of the 
Authority (Hilal and Khan 2004: 95). The inflows were conditional on the mainstream 
leadership continuing to abide by their commitment to continuing negotiations while 
the growing asymmetry of bargaining power and changing facts on the ground were 
glaringly obvious to all Palestinians. Most Palestinians continued to experience the 
humiliation and hardships of occupation on a daily basis.  
 
The growing Palestinian voices against the ‘corruption’ of the Authority refers much 
more to the political and moral corruption that they perceived, rather than the extent 
of actual corruption which had to some extent always existed in the Palestinian 
movement and indeed exists in every developing country. The corruption of the 
leadership had been a relatively minor complaint when the leadership had taken 
personal risks and had fought for sovereignty in realistic ways, even though their 
chances of success had always been small. Donors are almost certainly making a 
mistake if they believe the legitimacy of the mainstream leadership can be restored 
through conventional ‘anti-corruption’ policies. The type of ‘corruption’ at issue may 
be altogether different. 
 
3. Oslo’s Assumptions and the Crisis of State Formation in Palestine 
The Oslo Agreements and their successor, the Road Map, still provide the 
international framework for negotiations towards a two-state solution. It is therefore 
important to examine whether the very negative outcomes achieved after fifteen years 
of negotiations were due to structural flaws in the approach or merely unfortunate 
accidents. The Accords were brokered by interlocutors who believed a two-state 
solution could emerge by negotiation. This belief may initially have been plausible 
given that the stronger party, Israel, was threatened by the changing demographics in 
historic Palestine. The presumption was that if the parties could be brought to 
negotiate, Israeli self-interest would lead to a settlement along the lines of UN 
resolutions that called for an Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories, leading to a 
two-state solution. In exchange for giving up land that no-one recognized was Israeli, 
Israel was offered a plausible strategy for saving Zionism within its 1948 borders. 
 
The main constraint appeared to be the Palestinian aspiration for a homeland on all of 
Palestine in a secular state. But given the groundwork done by the Arafat leadership 
since 1988, a Palestinian state on 1967 borders may just have become ‘sellable’ to 
enough Palestinians to be legitimate and viable. However, given the stiff resistance 
the Palestinian leadership had faced to achieve this new position, it was unreasonable 
to expect it would be able to make further significant compromises. It follows that if 
this route was to lead to peace, a Palestinian state would have to be based on an Israeli 
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withdrawal to 1967 lines, occupied East Jerusalem would have to be ceded to the 
Palestinian state, and the injustice done to the refugees would have to be recognized 
and a solution found which may include significant compensation and a possibility of 
return of some refugees to Israel or the new Palestinian state.  
 
Perhaps external interlocutors felt that the minimum conditions of legitimacy for a 
Palestinian state were obvious and did not need to be spelled out. In signalling that 
they would accept a two-state solution the Palestinians had already reduced their 
claim from a hundred per cent to around twenty three per cent of what had been 
Palestine under the British Mandate. By focusing on recognized international 
boundaries, the Palestinians also hoped to reduce the scope for prolonged and bitter 
negotiations. Surely the Israelis would understand Palestinian red lines and would not 
expect further significant downward negotiation from this starting point given that a 
Palestinian ‘no’ would mean the re-emergence of the demographic threat to Zionism. 
These expectations about what may have been a reasonable Israeli response were not 
fulfilled. Nevertheless, given the apparently obvious Israeli interest in a viable two-
state solution, external sponsors could be forgiven for assuming there were no 
fundamental issues of bargaining left, what was required was confidence-building, 
technical capacity-building and agreeing the modalities of a transfer of power.  
 
External sponsors determined that capacity-building in Palestine should prioritize the 
provision of security to Israel and essential services to the Palestinians during the 
interim period. They also insisted that to bolster Israeli confidence, the Palestinians 
should keep repeating their recognition of Israel and therefore their commitment to 
the two-state solution and to non-violence. They did not adequately realize that if 
Israel did not share the assumption that Palestinian legitimacy required accepting 
international borders, these Palestinian pre-commitments significantly reduced 
Palestinian bargaining power. The external sponsors did not think it necessary to 
guarantee that Israel would not use Palestinian pre-commitments to continue to 
negotiate borders and sovereignty but now with enhanced bargaining power. But this 
is exactly what happened (Carter 2006). Like any occupying power, Israel began to 
behave in a more expansionist way when several credible threats of the Palestinians, 
in particular the threat of demanding equal civil rights from the Israeli state were 
removed. In the endless negotiations that followed (fifteen years so far with no end in 
sight), the Palestinians began to see the Israeli policy towards territory as one of 
‘What’s mine is mine, what’s yours we share’ (La Guardia 2007: 495).  
 
Inevitably, the legitimacy and authority of the mainstream Palestinian leadership as 
the leadership of a liberation movement came under increasing challenge as the sole 
strategy they were following was proving to be patently failing. But because the same 
leadership was also running the Authority, its low levels of legitimacy directly 
affected its ability to deliver on core functions like security that it had committed to 
provide. In the end, as we know, the cumulative decline in the legitimacy and 
authority of the mainstream leadership benefited previously minority factions and led 
to the unprecedented defeat of the secular wing of the Palestinian movement in the 
elections of 2006. The Hamas seizure of power in the Gaza Strip in 2007 marked a 
seismic shift in Palestinian politics, with the rift further exacerbated by the refusal of 
western powers to talk to the victors of the elections.  
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In principle, for Oslo to have succeeded, a series of very optimistic assumptions 
would have to be true in three interrelated areas. First, the success of the Oslo process 
required very optimistic assumptions about Israeli strategies. Secondly, given the 
focus on Palestinian state capacity-building, the implicit assumption was that the 
Palestinian Authority already had significant legitimacy and authority and specific 
capacity-building policies would not damage this legitimacy. And finally, given the 
significant role of external powers and donors, an implicit assumption was that their 
interests were aligned with significant Palestinian constituencies, and in particular 
with the Palestinian interest in liberation through a just settlement of the conflict. 
 
External Pressures and Donor Strategies. What are the 
state-building/peace-making strategies of world powers and 
donors? How do these strategies affect different aspects of 
the legitimacy of the Palestinian leadership?
Most optimistic
(land for peace)
Most realistic:
(asymmetric containment, matrix of control
Least optimistic: 
(peace for peace).
: Israel will concede sovereignty 
provided its security is assured . 
 Israel will concede limited 
sovereignty while trying to retain permanent 
control over borders, security arrangements, etc 
). 
Israel is managing the conflict 
using indefinite negotiations 
Israeli Strategic Objectives. Israel’s negotiating 
position has been to demand immediate security and 
recognition and  participating in negotiations: but what is 
Israel’s end-game and is Israel’s ‘best offer’ likely to be 
acceptable to a minimum number of Palestinians?
then
Palestinian Interim Strategies. How does the 
Palestinian Authority maintain its legitimacy both as a 
‘liberation movement’ negotiating with Israel  a 
‘government’ with vital functions but limited territories and 
sovereignty during an indefinite interim period? 
and
Should interim strategy focus on delivering 
plus or primarily 
on maximizing 
for achieving 
internal political and economic viability in 
an emerging economy? 
‘good governance’ security 
 
bargaining power 
effective
vis-a-vis 
Israel? Are conventional good governance 
strategies in any case 
Are donor strategies enhancing the legitimacy 
and therefore the viability of the Palestinian 
Authority or the reverse? How are donor 
strategies impacting on the bargaining power of 
Palestinians vis-a-vis Israelis?
 
Figure 3 Interdependent Assumptions Affecting Palestinian State Formation 
 
The range of assumptions that we can make about these three interdependent factors 
are summarized in Figure 3. Assessments of state formation in Palestine have failed to 
focus sufficiently on the interdependence of these factors. Interdependence means that 
strategies that may make sense with one set of assumptions may have very damaging 
consequences in another. For instance, if the Israeli political process had been willing 
to concede Palestinian sovereignty in the territories conquered in 1967 as the price of 
security and for securing a Jewish state within the internationally recognized borders 
of Israel, donor strategies that focused on governance and security reforms within the 
Authority would be both appropriate and may plausibly have accelerated transition to 
statehood. On the other hand, if Israel was at best willing to concede one or more 
‘homelands’ with limited sovereignty, donor pressure on the Authority to focus only 
on internal reforms and to keep on negotiating could directly have contributed to a 
catastrophic collapse in the legitimacy of the Authority and its loss of leadership to 
more uncompromising coalitions.  
 
The situation in 2009 after Israel’s latest invasion of Gaza is not only a devastated 
Palestinian economy and society, but also a divided Palestinian movement where 
donors have limited options of engagement that are likely to be effective or legitimate. 
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If this is not an accidental or unexpected outcome, further damaging interventions in 
Palestinian politics and economics need to be avoided. Interdependence suggests that 
if external powers are dissatisfied with what has happened and want to construct a 
viable Palestinian political future, a series of factors that are obstacles to progress 
need to be addressed. A focus only on internal Palestinian governance conditions or 
capabilities is likely to continue to fail.  
 
Israeli Strategic Objectives 
Israel’s strategic superiority in the conflict means that a solution that emerged through 
negotiation would depend greatly on Israel’s perception of its own strategic interests. 
Identifying Israel’s strategic interests is not easy because Israeli politicians often 
within the same government have frequently made contradictory statements about 
objectives, and the same politician has often changed positions significantly over 
short periods of time. As a result, a reading of Israel’s perception of its strategic 
interests can range from the reasonably optimistic, to an intermediate possibility that 
is far less optimistic, and some very pessimistic possibilities. In the following we 
outline three possible Israeli strategic game plans (land-for-peace, asymmetric 
containment, and peace-for-peace) with very different implications for negotiated 
outcomes to peace.  
 
The most optimistic interpretation of Israeli strategic goals is that Israeli policy-
makers clearly understood the implications of a legitimate ‘land for peace’ deal. If 
land for peace meant the creation of a Palestinian state that was viable, it would have 
to have broad legitimacy within the Palestinian population. It would be a plausible 
expectation that a withdrawal to 1967 borders in line with UN resolutions is likely to 
be the minimum condition for achieving this. If a lesser Palestinian state failed to be 
legitimate, it would not be viable and peace would not be achieved. A reasonable 
interpretation would be that informed Israeli strategic planners would know they had 
to rapidly withdraw to 1967 borders to allow a sovereign Palestinian state to emerge 
on that territory. The outstanding issues would then indeed be one of minor details of 
unavoidable border adjustments, the compensation and fate of refugees but primarily 
of Palestinians being able to satisfy Israeli security concerns.  
 
But in fact, Israel’s actions over the last fifteen years have been largely inconsistent 
with this assumption. A less optimistic intermediate assumption about Israel’s 
strategic goals consistent with many facts on the ground and Israeli statements is that 
Israel is only willing to concede a Palestinian state with limited sovereignty. Israel’s 
persistence in expanding settlements located in occupied territories after signing the 
Oslo Accords only makes sense as a strategy of controlling entry and exit into and 
even movements within the future Palestinian ‘state’. Israel’s intransigence in 
conceding relatively small territories inside the future Palestinian state after the 
Palestinians recognized Israel only makes sense from this perspective. Israeli actions 
in building new settlements, military roads and border controls after signing Oslo 
have been described as a strategy of maintaining a ‘matrix of control’, ‘asymmetric 
containment’, or ‘apartheid’ over the Palestinian territories as a long-term strategy 
(Halper 2001; Khan 2005; Carter 2006; Halper 2007a, 2007b).  
 
A number of different arguments put forward by Israeli academics and politicians 
provide possible justifications for this underlying Israeli strategy. First, the relatively 
small size of Israel and its lack of strategic depth made Israeli strategic thinkers 
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obsessed about territorial depth (Alpher 1994; Steinitz, et al. 2005). These concerns 
could explain why Israeli negotiators insisted on keeping control over key parts of the 
West Bank, in particular to control the Jordan border and to maintain critical 
settlements which would allow Israel strategic access inside the West Bank, even if 
this converted the West Bank into a number of unconnected cantons entirely encircled 
by Israeli forces. More seriously, a significant strand of political opinion within Israel, 
most clearly articulated by Binyamin Netanyahu, has explicitly questioned whether a 
Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza could solve Israel’s problem of 
consolidating Zionism. Their criticism was that this ‘solution’ would do little to 
reduce the challenge posed to Zionism by the twenty per cent or so of the Israeli 
population who would remain non-Jewish. In the eyes of many Israelis, the different 
aspects of the Palestinian problem are not at all separate (Morris 2002; Yiftachel 
2002; Brownfeld 2003).  
 
From this perspective, Israel’s best strategy would be to concede at most some form 
of limited self-government to the Palestinians falling short of full sovereignty (Khan 
2005). Not defining permanent borders would keep Israel’s options open with respect 
to how it might deal in future with its internal Palestinians, and it would also ensure 
that the Palestinian state could never become a strategic threat. This underlying 
rationale could explain why after signing Oslo Israel continued to deepen and 
construct what Halper describes as the ‘matrix of control’ (Halper 2001) and we 
described as ‘asymmetric containment’ (Khan, et al. 2004). These terms refer to the 
network of military roads, strategic settlements and border controls that Israel 
continued to construct and deepen, and the implementation of economic arrangements 
that deepened the Israeli stranglehold over the Palestinian economy at a time when it 
was apparently negotiating Palestinian independence.  
 
However, the most pessimistic possibility is that Israel does not even have a strategy 
of conceding homelands or Bantustans to the Palestinians. Rather, its perception of its 
strategic vulnerability may be so severe that it intends only to permanently ‘manage’ 
the conflict through reversible withdrawals from limited areas. This strategy, 
described as ‘peace for peace’, effectively means that instead of buying peace by 
creating a viable Palestinian state, or even Palestinian homelands, Israel should buy 
peace by moving out of densely populated Palestinian areas and convincing the 
Palestinians that if they are aggressive they can become the target of hugely 
asymmetric Israeli attacks.  
 
Variants of these ideas emerged from neoconservative US advisors to Binyamin 
Netanyahu. They recommended a strategy of ‘peace for peace’ with the advice that 
Israel must abandon any illusions of a ‘comprehensive settlement’ while always 
maintaining the ‘right of hot pursuit’ into Palestinian territories (Perle, et al. 1996). 
Sharon too, while paying lip service to the Road Map clearly believed that any plan 
for a permanent peace with the Palestinians was futile if not dangerous, and Israel 
needed a strategy for managing the conflict in the long term (La Guardia 2007: 429). 
Israel’s Gaza War of 2008-09 and the subsequent ‘ceasefire’ is an applied example of 
the ‘peace for peace’ strategy. Netanyahu has also recently suggested (before the 
Gaza invasion) that discussions about a political settlement should be postponed in 
favour of Israel working for ‘economic peace’ within the patchwork of partial 
withdrawals from Palestinian areas that is the current situation (Bousso 2008).  
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Developments since the breakdown of the Camp David talks have made it easier for 
Israel to pursue a ‘peace for peace’ strategy. The construction of Sharon’s ‘temporary 
barrier’ and the April 2004 letter from President Bush to Prime Minister Sharon 
fundamentally changed the parameters of the Road Map and undermined UN 
Resolution 242, the basis of the two-state solution. The core of the Bush letter later 
ratified by the US House of Representatives by a vote of 407-9 and the Senate by 95-1 
was the recognition that ‘in light of new realities on the ground, including already 
existing major Israeli population centres, it is unrealistic to expect the outcome of 
final status negotiations will be a full and complete return to the armistice lines of 
1949’ (Halper 2007b). The implications of Israel keeping the major settlement blocs 
which sit atop vital aquifers in the West Bank, and keeping East Jerusalem which is 
the economic and cultural heart of a future Palestinian state, and the Jordan valley 
settlements which control the Jordan border are clear. No legitimate Palestinian state 
can emerge or possibly even be discussed with this starting point, making ‘peace for 
peace’ the default strategy.  
 
While western countries have insisted that Palestinians who used the language of 
violence against Israel could not be part of a non-sovereign Palestinian ‘government’, 
they have tolerated Israeli governments with ministers like Rehavam Zeevi, Benny 
Elon and others who openly advocated the ethnic cleansing of West Bank Palestinians 
and the disenfranchisement of Israeli Arabs while others in the same government were 
ostensibly discussing the creation of a Palestinian state (La Guardia 2007: 492-3). All 
that we need to conclude is that it would be simplistic to presume that the optimistic 
interpretation of ‘land for peace’ is the consensus or even dominant position in Israel. 
But any other Israeli position, whether one of asymmetric containment or one of 
peace for peace would require a significant re-examination of the viability of the Oslo 
route to building peace.  
 
Interim Palestinian Priorities for Capability Building 
Palestinian capability building strategies during the Oslo period needed to address two 
related questions. First, as a national liberation movement, what capabilities would 
enhance the bargaining power of the liberation movement in its conflict with Israel? 
And secondly, as an Authority engaged in limited self-government in parts of the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip, what institutional capabilities were most essential for 
enhancing the economic and political viability of the Authority?  
 
Functional Capabilities for leading a Liberation Struggle 
Following the signing of the Oslo Accords Palestinian liberation became entirely 
dependent on the success of this track of negotiations. The Palestinian leadership 
implicitly accepted capability-building priorities that were consistent with this track, 
most importantly prioritizing security capabilities to provide security to Israel. If the 
Israeli strategy was to create a viable Palestinian state on the basis of land-for-peace, 
the Palestinians would arguably no longer have required significant bargaining power 
vis-à-vis Israel. Indeed under these conditions, the development of security 
capabilities may have enhanced Palestinian bargaining power to demand an 
accelerated transition to full sovereignty.  
 
However, a focus on providing security to Israel in a context where a viable 
Palestinian state was not the Israeli end-game had disastrous consequences for 
Palestinian bargaining power (and therefore for the legitimacy of the leadership of the 
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liberation movement). The prioritization of security in this context allowed Israel to 
continue the occupation and indeed to deepen settlements, barriers, checkpoints and 
so on at a lower cost than before, changing the ‘facts on the ground’ to Israel’s 
advantage. Moreover, as many Palestinians responded to Israeli containment 
strategies with violent resistance, the Authority lost further legitimacy and found it 
increasingly difficult to enforce security, allowing Israel to argue that Palestinians 
were not keeping their end of the bargain.  
 
If Israel’s objective turned out to be asymmetric containment or peace-for-peace, the 
Palestinian liberation movement required significantly different political strategies to 
strengthen its bargaining power vis-à-vis Israel. Did the Palestinian leadership have 
any viable options? Clearly its bargaining power and strategic options were very 
limited to begin with, but as the limitations of Oslo became clearer, there were 
certainly alternatives that the leadership may have considered. While military 
strategies were never credible given the vast asymmetry of power, other political 
strategies may have been. For instance, Palestinian civil society organizations could 
have been mobilized to demand civil, economic and political rights from Israel as the 
occupying power during the interim period even as negotiations for a Palestinian state 
were continuing. This would have signalled to Israel that Zionism was not necessarily 
safe and the failure of negotiations could lead to a demand for political rights within 
Israel. Although Palestinians have never effectively deployed this threat, many Israeli 
leaders have explicitly indicated that this is the only Palestinian threat they are 
worried about as it could lead (in the words of Ehud Olmert) to Israel ‘losing 
everything’ (La Guardia 2007: 440-1).  
 
These counterfactual suggestions are only indicative. They may not have worked or 
they may not have been acceptable to the Palestinian polity. Our aim is not to claim 
any specific alternative route was viable. It is only to suggest that alternatives always 
exist. Paradoxically, even from Israel’s perspective, it is possible that political and 
institutional attempts by Palestinians to mobilize their demographic threat may have 
signalled the urgency of creating a Palestinian state before the acceleration of 
settlement activity created significant new facts on the ground. This may have saved 
Israel from the dangerous impasse it now finds itself in. Clearly, Palestinian security 
capabilities were important. But the prioritization of security as the critical capability 
for the Palestinian Authority surely damaged Palestinian bargaining power and the 
legitimacy of its leadership (Khan 2005). The Palestinian leadership should have 
truthfully pointed out that effective security depended on the legitimacy of the end-
game, and focused on how to legitimately enhance Palestinian bargaining power. Its 
failure to do this resulted in an unprecedented loss of legitimacy and the emergence of 
Hamas as a major player in Palestinian politics for the first time (Hroub 2008). 
 
Governance Capabilities for Viable Self-Governance 
The debate about the governance capabilities appropriate for the Palestinian Authority 
was dominated by the consensus opinion that developing countries needed to develop 
‘good governance’ capabilities. These are capabilities to protect property rights, fight 
corruption, enforce a rule of law and ensure the accountability of the executive. The 
theory was that these governance capabilities would assist developing countries to 
achieve economic and political viability (Khan 2004). In theory, the conditions of 
good governance can help to achieve stable political governments and efficient 
market economies. But given that the conditions of good governance are expensive to 
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achieve and take a lot of time, the comparative evidence shows that even high growth 
and developmental states in developing countries have governance characteristics that 
are far removed from the requirements of good governance. In the Palestinian case, 
the absence of sovereignty meant that even as a benchmark the good governance 
capabilities were not very useful targets to judge performance in the Palestinian 
Authority. Nevertheless, the discourse of good governance was widely used to judge 
and to criticize the performance of the Authority as an institution of Palestinian self-
governance and service delivery during the interim period. 
 
We have argued that the relevant comparator for the Palestinian Authority should 
have been the high growth developmental states, not the theoretical good governance 
model, and even there, adjustments should be made to take into account the absence 
of sovereignty in the Palestinian case (Khan, et al. 2004). When we judge the 
Palestinian Authority in its early years (1994-2000) using these alternative criteria and 
examine the extent to which the Authority was able to maintain internal political 
stability and attract new investments and generate some additional economic growth 
we reach rather more optimistic conclusions about its potential viability if sovereignty 
could have been achieved (Khan, et al. 2004). 
 
In the early years, from 1994-2000, when the legitimacy of the Authority had not yet 
seriously declined, the leadership of the Authority took pragmatic steps to develop 
capabilities that proved to be fairly successful in achieving growth and stability. The 
Authority had strong incentives to develop these capabilities because its legitimacy 
and authority in managing self-governance depended on the delivery of internal 
political stability and economic opportunities. In Khan et al. (2004) we describe how 
over this period, using a mix of carrots and sticks, the Palestinian Authority managed 
to achieve substantial internal political stability under conditions that were potentially 
seriously destabilizing. Similarly, by creating judicious privileges for investors the 
Authority also managed to attract significant foreign investment (primarily from 
expatriate Palestinian investors) in a potential warzone even though it had virtually no 
sovereign capability to protect the rights of investors.  
 
Thus while there was certainly a focus on security and good governance capabilities, 
the pragmatic aspects of the early leadership of the Authority meant that internal 
viability was maintained for a while. While not fulfilling the conditions of good 
governance, its performance was not significantly worse and in some respects much 
better than many other developing countries which would be judged to be perfectly 
viable. From this perspective, the failure of Palestinian state formation under Oslo had 
little to do with the failure of the Authority to achieve minimal conditions for internal 
political and economic viability. This assessment provides reasons for believing that if 
sovereignty could have been rapidly achieved during this period, the emergent 
Palestinian state may have achieved sufficient viability comparable to other 
developing country states (Hilal and Khan 2004; Khan 2004).  
 
The problem of course was that the Palestinian leadership did not have a viable 
strategy for winning the liberation struggle, and as a consequence it began to lose its 
legitimacy in both arenas, particularly after 2000. The legitimacy failure began not in 
the operation of the Authority, but in the leadership of the liberation struggle, in the 
failure to respond adequately to settlement expansion, road building and other aspects 
of asymmetric containment. But the declining legitimacy of the leadership of the 
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liberation struggle inevitably had a feedback effect on the effectiveness of the 
Authority. In particular, it had an effect on the capacity of the Authority to limit or 
control acts of violence directed against the Israeli occupation, and eventually 
violence between Palestinian factions became increasingly intense. There began a 
gradual shift in popular support away from the mainstream secular leadership towards 
Hamas and other radical groups who had always expressed scepticism about the Oslo 
process and about Israeli intentions.  
 
As it became clearer that a sovereign Palestinian state was not likely to be rapidly 
achieved, even the pragmatic capabilities of the Authority to sustain internal growth 
and stability can be questioned. Perhaps more appropriate governance strategies 
should have been identified for the Authority by the late 1990s. Perhaps capabilities 
for sustaining the Palestinian population over a protracted period of struggle should 
have been accorded priority as a governance goal. If sovereignty could not be 
achieved immediately, and indeed as the West Bank became a checker-board of 
isolated pockets, it did not matter that the Authority had been effective in attracting 
investments in hotels. The centralized structure of the Authority was very good for 
functions appropriate for an emerging sovereign state, but as blockades and territorial 
fragmentation began to emerge as indefinite features, the Authority failed to respond 
with appropriate survival strategies. For the Palestinian polity as a whole, the 
challenge in the future will be to re-orient self-government capabilities to devise 
survival strategies to deal with the encirclement and siege of pockets of Palestinians.  
 
External Powers and Donor Strategies 
The final factor jointly determining the outcome of the Oslo process was the role of 
donors and the ‘international community’. External powers and donors played a 
prominent role in the Oslo process from its inception. They were at the forefront of 
determining Palestinian strategic priorities. For instance, donors pushed for both the 
prioritization of good governance and security capabilities for the Palestinian 
Authority, and less openly, they attempted to strengthen factions and individuals who 
were perceived to be more flexible in making peace. These roles had important effects 
both intended and unintended. We have already discussed the effects of security 
prioritization in a context of slow or no progress towards a sovereign state.  
 
Similarly, the manner in which good governance was supported also frequently 
contributed to delegitimizing the Authority. The violation of good governance 
requirements (in particular the accountability of the executive and adherence to the 
rule of law) was often ignored when it came to delivering security for Israel. But in 
other areas, the Authority was expected to meet standards of good governance that 
developing countries with sovereign states could not have met. Donors frequently 
appeared to make no distinction between achievable and feasible improvements in 
accountability, anti-corruption and other governance goals that were realistic for a 
non-sovereign ‘Authority’ to achieve in the midst of occupation and struggle, and the 
standards of good governance in text books. By setting the Authority a set of 
conditions that perhaps could not be met, donors inadvertently undermined its 
legitimacy. And by being selective about the areas where the Authority did not come 
in for criticism, external powers frequently undermined their own legitimacy.  
 
The role of donors clearly has to be evaluated as part of the interdependent system of 
factors described in Figure 3. If the most optimistic assumptions about Israeli strategic 
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objectives turned out to be true, a Palestinian liberation leadership following the Oslo 
route may have been able to maintain its legitimacy because Israel would have rapidly 
started to withdraw to 1967 borders without asymmetric containment of the areas it 
was withdrawing from. And even with somewhat unrealistic ideas about the 
feasibility of good governance on the part of some donors, we know that the 
effectiveness of the Authority in sustaining critical aspects of economic growth and 
political stability was not too poor in its early years. In that context, the role of donors 
in prioritizing the development of security capabilities, but also in providing 
investment for infrastructure and in financing essential service delivery to core 
constituencies may have turned out to be very beneficial.  
 
But with a different mix of assumptions these same policies could be worse than 
ineffective: they could contribute to political impasse and the delegitimization of the 
secular Palestinian leadership. For instance, if we assume that Israel did not have a 
political consensus behind land-for-peace, an assumption that is very consistent with 
the experience of the past fifteen years, the implications of donor policies become 
very different. This assumption is consistent with the observation that settlement 
activity did not slow down but rather accelerated after Oslo, and that Israel engaged in 
the systematic construction of a matrix of control and of asymmetric containment over 
the 1967 territories. In this context, when donors insisted that the Palestinian 
leadership should continue to behave as if land-for-peace was the dominant Israeli 
strategy, they surely contributed to the slow seeping away of the legitimacy of this 
leadership. While the failure to change its own strategic behaviour must of course 
primarily be a failure of the Palestinian leadership, external and donor strategies may 
have made their task many times more difficult for a number of reasons.  
 
First, a major component of donor funding to the Authority went to directly provide 
jobs for a significant part of the Palestinian population in areas like security and 
administration. These employees and their families and dependents provided an 
important political constituency supporting the Palestinian leadership. From the 
figures that suggest that roughly 20 per cent of employment in the occupied territories 
was connected to the Authority, and that these jobs had rates of pay that were higher 
than average, it is possible to extrapolate that maybe a third of the Palestinian 
population was dependent on these donor resource flows. These resource flows may 
have been terminated if donors had lost confidence in the leadership of the Palestinian 
Authority. This structure of assistance created the perception of very high costs for the 
Palestinian electorate and civil society if it decided to express doubts about the 
viability of the Oslo process.  
 
That this was perhaps not an incorrect perception was proved when Palestinians voted 
the wrong way in 2006 and external powers refused to engage with Hamas. However, 
in some ways this was not a proper test of the inflexibility of western strategic 
thinking. This is because there were other issues (justifiable or not) that may have 
precluded western support for Hamas. A proper test would have emerged if the 
secular mainstream leadership had begun to open up strategic options by engaging in 
political mobilization around civil and political rights in the way suggested earlier. 
Unfortunately this critical possibility was never tested. If alternative strategies were 
non-violent ones, for instance to mobilize civil society to demand rights, and if they 
were combined with conditional recognition of Israel in its 1948 borders, western 
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support for the Authority may not have evaporated, or at least may not have done so 
very suddenly.  
 
The failure of the mainstream leadership to openly evolve any significant autonomous 
strategies points to a second and perhaps more invidious effect of significant external 
involvement in the peace process. This presence created strong incentives for 
ambitious individuals within the Authority to seek the recognition and trust of 
external powers as a way of bolstering their internal power. It is therefore not 
surprising that ambitious individuals within the Palestinian leadership looking to 
sustain their powers and privileges would gravitate towards the uncritical adoption of 
the priorities of dominant external powers without asking if this was contributing to 
Palestinian national liberation.  
 
The close association between some leaders of the Palestinian security establishment 
and the US became clear in early 2007 when forces loyal to the Palestinian security 
chief Muhammad Dahlan attempted to seize power in Gaza allegedly with the close 
support of the US (Rose 2008). The military and financial support for Palestinian 
leaders who were close to external powers obviously made these individuals powerful 
within the Palestinian leadership. This made it difficult to question leaders close to 
external powers, and it resulted in the isolation of mainstream leaders who were even 
a little distant from the western consensus. This trap ensured that the opinions 
expressed within the leadership were never too distant from the ones supported by 
external sponsors. This made it very difficult for an alternative Palestinian leadership 
to emerge within the mainstream after Arafat’s death. It also resulted in a loss of 
legitimacy for the entire leadership as ordinary Palestinians began to ask whose 
interests they represented.  
 
Paradoxically, in trying to keep the Palestinian leadership on a very narrow track 
through these types of incentives, external support had very damaging effects because 
it failed to deliver a sovereign state or even to block accelerated Israeli land grabbing. 
Western powers appeared to have no inkling about the dramatic decline in the 
legitimacy of their preferred Palestinian leaders as a result of binding them to a path 
that was not delivering any success. The fact that President Bush actually put pressure 
on the Palestinian leadership to hold the elections of 2006 suggests that he and his 
analysts had a very poor understanding of the determinants of legitimacy for the 
ostensible leaders of a liberation struggle (Rose 2008). The Hamas victory in the 2006 
elections reflected Palestinian frustration with the in-built contradictions within the 
Oslo process that resulted in encirclement and impoverishment while their leadership 
persisted in negotiations. Donor and external involvement in buttressing a specific 
leadership meant that alternative voices could only surface in an entirely disconnected 
political movement, namely Hamas. To make matters worse, external responses to the 
Hamas victory showed that even after the humiliation of Fatah, they still had no 
understanding of the significance of what had happened.  
 
The unanimous response of external powers and donors was to focus on Hamas’s 
Charter and its refusal to formally recognize Israel, without asking why Fatah had lost 
its support so precipitately. Even worse, the practical response of external powers was 
to financially isolate Hamas and to portray as the only credible and internationally 
acceptable Palestinian leaders the very individuals whose policies of national 
liberation had failed so dismally in the previous ten years. Quite apart from how 
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donors are now perceived in Palestine, the negative impact on the legitimacy of Fatah 
and the Oslo process cannot be overstated. The decline or even the significant loss of 
legitimacy of the secular leadership of the liberation struggle is likely to have lasting 
impacts well beyond the failure of the Oslo process. 
 
4. Oslo and the Fragmentation of Palestinian Society and Polity 
The serious and ongoing consequences of Oslo include not just the gradual 
fragmentation and delegitimization of the secular Palestinian national leadership but 
also the associated political and social fragmentation of Palestinian society. These 
effects are closely connected to the vicious cycle of declining political legitimacy and 
authority that the Palestinian leadership became trapped in. The separate sources of 
legitimacy of the Palestinian leadership as leaders of a liberation struggle and 
managers of an Authority engaged in limited self-government allows us to understand 
the cumulative causation of declining legitimacy and fragmentation better. Drawing 
on our earlier discussion, the structural features of Oslo that created these outcomes 
and the main links in the vicious cycle are summarized in Figure 4.  
 
Loss of Effectiveness: Initially 
Authority successful in maintaining 
stability and investment. But loss of 
legitimacy in national liberation 
gradually affects implementation of  
security and service delivery.
Israeli Bargaining Position 
further strengthened: Existing 
facts on the ground become 
starting points for new round of 
negotiation, justified by 
Palestinian lack of commitment 
to Israeli security.
National Leadership loses 
Legitimacy: Israel creates new 
facts on the ground while 
Palestinian leadership lives 
privileged lifestyles. Palestinian 
society and polity begin to 
fragment.
Structural Flaws in Oslo 
Israeli bargaining power 
unchecked while Palestinians 
give up critical powers in 
advance. Allows Israel to 
sequentially pare down the 
‘best offer’
External Powers 
restrict parties to 
adhere to the 
Oslo Process
 
Figure 4 Oslo and the Fragmentation of Palestinian Society and Polity  
 
Figure 4 highlights the role of the external powers since they played a critical role in 
the Oslo dynamic by insisting that the parties adhere to the Oslo process. As we have 
discussed, there were structural flaws in the analysis of the obstacles to peace. Oslo 
required no explicit statement from Israel committing it to a legitimate Palestinian 
state, no framework for monitoring Israeli adherence to its commitments and of 
course no mechanism for sanctioning Israel for non-compliance. On the contrary, 
Oslo was premised on the assumption that Israel wanted a viable two-state solution in 
its own interest. As a result, no preconditions had to be demanded from Israel, but 
Palestinians needed to give up significant elements of their bargaining power which 
were presumably no longer needed and which would contribute to ‘confidence 
building’. These included giving up the right of resistance, a commitment to security 
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prioritization, acceptance of the two-state parameters and repeated confirmation of the 
prior Palestinian recognition of Israel. Instead of enabling the rapid emergence of a 
Palestinian state, these prior commitments by the Palestinians appeared only to 
embolden Israel to use an even greater asymmetry in bargaining power to create new 
facts on the ground.  
 
The first link in Figure 4 highlights the structural flaw in Oslo that exacerbated and 
institutionalized the asymmetry in bargaining power between Israel and the 
Palestinians. This asymmetry allowed Israel to immediately pare down what was ‘on 
offer’ to the Palestinians, and as the vicious cycle deepened, what was on offer 
became less at each subsequent round of negotiation. The second link in Figure 4 
shows that this had a significant effect on the legitimacy of the Palestinian leadership 
of the liberation struggle, even though its legitimacy did not collapse immediately. 
The main effect in the early years was that support for Oslo did not grow within the 
Palestinian population, and rejectionists in Hamas and other radical parties did not 
lose their support. Initially, the oppositionists were far too small to constitute an 
effective challenge to the mainstream leadership’s support for Oslo. Eventually, 
however, Israel’s continued creation of new facts on the ground and growing 
asymmetric containment of Palestinians did impact on the legitimacy of the 
Palestinian leadership. After the Camp David debacle of 2000, it was increasingly 
difficult for Palestinian leaders to continue their adherence to Oslo and yet retain high 
levels of internal legitimacy.  
 
The third link in Figure 4 shows that declining legitimacy also had significant effects 
on the effectiveness of the Palestinian Authority. The initial capacity of the Authority 
to attract investment and provide stability and security was based on its legitimacy, 
despite its very limited powers and sovereignty. But as progress towards statehood 
remained blocked and in many respects began to be reversed, the legitimacy required 
for effectiveness was inevitably affected. This became particularly obvious in the vital 
area of security where the performance of the Authority was closely monitored by 
Israel and external powers and was used to justify significant reversals of Israeli 
commitments. The declining ability of the mainstream leadership to maintain internal 
security is a significant indicator of their problems with legitimacy and effectiveness. 
In the early years, Arafat’s lieutenants like Muhammad Dahlan were successfully able 
to deliver internal security even though this often required unpopular methods such as 
detention without trial. However, by 2007, the same Dahlan facing the same 
opposition in Gaza had become utterly ineffective. In June 2007 significantly larger 
and better armed Fatah security forces were routed by Hamas. 
 
The final link in the chain in Figure 4 shows that the poor and declining effectiveness 
of the Authority even in functions that it had accepted as priorities (in particular 
security) were used by Israel to argue why its new facts on the ground in the form of 
checkpoints, settlement expansions, security barriers, border controls, and so on were 
legitimate because Palestinians obviously did not have the capacity to govern 
themselves or provide security to Israel. This increased Israeli bargaining power in the 
next round of negotiations, allowing it to further pare down the ‘best offer’ to the 
Palestinians. The vicious cycle could then begin feeding on itself, with continuously 
declining legitimacy, effectiveness and even worse bargaining power for the 
Palestinians in subsequent rounds of negotiations.  
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The progress of this vicious cycle can be tracked by the sequentially inferior ‘best 
offer’ available for the Palestinians. Oslo began with the Palestinians already in a 
weak position after the debacles of Lebanon and the first Iraq war. The implicit best 
offer to the Palestinians in 1994 had already come down from an equal share in 
Mandate Palestine (the one-state solution) to a roughly 23 per cent state (the occupied 
territories, still the minimum acceptable two-state solution from the Palestinian 
perspective). But this offer was never explicitly made, and its parameters did not last 
long. Within days of signing the Oslo Accords, Israel’s construction of roads, 
roadblocks and settlements made it clear that the Palestinian state if it ever emerged 
would be a lesser state. Israel’s best offer at Camp David in 2000 offered 91 per cent 
of the West Bank ‘as the basis for discussion’ but without any maps, and excluded 
large parts of East Jerusalem, the settlements and military roads. The Palestinian 
understanding of the discussion was that the West Bank would be split into three 
cantons (La Guardia 2007: 294-8). By 2004, the Bush letter to Sharon, who had 
started building his separation barrier, recognized some or all of the Israeli 
annexations and set a new starting point for the next round of ‘negotiation’. Thus, the 
cycle in Figure 4 is a continuous one, with each round requiring the Palestinian 
leadership to continue negotiating on even less legitimate terms from the perspective 
of the national aspirations of the Palestinian people.  
 
Once this cycle had become entrenched, the failure of the Palestinian leadership to 
detach itself from the process resulted in a cumulative loss of its legitimacy and the 
growing fragmentation of Palestinian society and polity. The Palestinian social and 
political unity that had been forged under the PLO’s leadership began to be strained as 
factions opposed to Oslo began to pick up greater support. This process accelerated 
significantly after Arafat’s death, when the leadership was persuaded to enter new 
negotiations along the old lines as if the failure of Camp David and the Second 
Intifada had never happened. After each round Israel emerged with even greater 
bargaining power, offering even less to the Palestinians and further destroying the 
legitimacy of its national leadership.  
 
Many post-2000 Israeli statements, some of them supported by the US indicate that a 
sovereign Palestinian state is very unlikely to emerge through Israel’s participation in 
the Oslo process and the Road Map. Sharon explicitly articulated the possibility of 
Israel unilaterally declaring and enforcing the borders of a Palestinian state, making 
the ‘state’ on offer not much different from a prison. While this claim was not widely 
supported by external powers, Israel received US support in the Road Map for 
exploring the possibility of creating a Palestinian state without specified borders (the 
concept of provisional borders). If we understand sovereignty to mean the legitimate 
authority of a state over a specified territory, a state with provisional borders cannot 
be sovereign. Not even the most flexible Palestinian leaders could enter negotiations 
for a state with limited sovereignty and hope to achieve legitimacy. But there are also 
strong indications that ‘peace for peace’ is now the default Israeli strategy. For 
instance, Sharon’s advisor Dov Weissglass explained in Ha’aretz in October 2004 
why the Israeli disengagement from Gaza was actually a tactic designed to prevent 
any political discussion with the Palestinians about a Palestinian state (La Guardia 
2007: 426). After the Gaza war of 2008-09 the dominant discourse is likely to be 
along the lines of ‘peace for peace’ negotiations for some time. Unfortunately, 
external powers have forced the mainstream Palestinian leadership to continue 
negotiations as if a viable Palestinian state based on ‘land for peace’ was just round 
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the corner. This insistence has only served to discredit Palestinian leaders engaging in 
negotiations under these conditions.  
 
The collapse of a united Palestinian liberation movement is likely to have long-term 
effects that cannot be overestimated. The fragmentation of Palestinian society into 
isolated cantons, villages and cities by checkpoints and security barriers now has a 
political parallel. Palestinians no longer have a single political leadership to identify 
with and coordinate around. The geographic fragmentation is therefore mirrored in 
political and social fragmentation. Reconstructing a Palestinian national movement is 
likely to take a long time, with significant internal debates taking place about strategy, 
tactics and goals before a legitimate and united national leadership can re-emerge out 
of this debacle.  
 
It is vital for neutrals in the international community to recognize that this crisis has 
deep roots in a long-term decline in the legitimacy of the mainstream leadership and 
that this collapse of legitimacy will not be easy to undo. This is particularly the case 
because the mainstream leadership is closely tied to western political strategies that 
fundamentally misunderstand Israeli insecurities and strategic goals. And even if 
these strategic goals begin to be understood, western countries are unlikely to be 
willing to challenge Israeli strategic goals in the near future.  
 
This means that we have to recognize that a two-state solution is not at all close in 
Israel-Palestine. We have to recognize that Palestinian society is in an indefinite 
interim period and it is important to come up with an appropriate set of strategies that 
provide human security for the Palestinians, and give them time to re-order their 
political representation and national strategies in ways that are likely to be effective in 
the medium to long run. A continued focus on supporting what is now clearly a failed 
state-building agenda on the false presumption that a two-state solution is just round 
the corner can only do further damage to an already damaged Palestinian polity.  
 
5. Reshaping the Agenda: Prospects for the Future  
The period we are now in can be described as a period of indefinite transition for the 
Palestinian people. It is extremely unlikely that this transition will be short because 
Israel’s dominant strategy appears to be to manage this transition for as long as it can. 
We have seen that this can make sense from an Israeli perspective given Israel’s own 
internal perceptions of its strategic interests and concerns. The prospects of achieving 
Palestinian rights therefore depend on how Palestinians cope during this transition 
period. The prospects of achieving Palestinian rights, let alone future statehood, will 
be seriously diminished if the transition period results in an ongoing fragmentation of 
the Palestinian polity, its disintegration into regional and factional groups and of 
course if it collapses into internal warfare. To some extent this has already happened 
with the effective separation of Gaza that was preceded by a period of intense internal 
conflict. Given the deep external involvement in the genesis of this crisis at all stages 
including the Oslo period, it is important for external agencies and powers to 
understand that this collapse is not accidental, but has deep structural drivers. It is in 
this context that the UN’s concept of ‘larger freedom’ and the broader concept of 
human security that is associated with it provide important entry points for redefining 
engagement with Palestinians in fruitful ways.  
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‘In Larger Freedom’ and Broader Human Security  
The concept of ‘larger freedom’ as defined in an important United Nations document 
signed by Kofi Annan recognizes the interdependence of the freedom from want, the 
freedom from fear and the freedom to live in dignity (Annan 2005). This 
interdependence recognizes the types of interdependencies we have discussed earlier 
between state capabilities, the choice of state priorities, the human, social and political 
aspirations of a people and the legitimacy or otherwise of the institutions through 
which these are expressed. The document recognizes for instance that economic 
progress (freedom from want) cannot be delivered if many or most people in a society 
are suffering from high levels of conflict (the absence of freedom from fear). Conflict 
and wars in turn cannot be addressed if the institutions attempting to resolve these 
conflicts are not recognized as legitimate because they do not represent the rights of 
many or most people that are to be subjected to policing (the absence of the freedom 
to live in dignity). The concept of larger freedom therefore defines a broader and 
interdependent conception of human security that is essential to retrieve because one-
sided or partial interventions that ignored these interdependencies have clearly had 
seriously negative effects in general, and particularly in the Palestinian context.  
 
Conditions in Palestine have clearly been inimical for the achievement of most 
aspects of broader human security. This framework allows us to question the focus of 
conventional security programmes that have focused on bureaucratic-technical 
capabilities for ‘delivering’ security and some vital economic services. If success in 
the delivery of physical security depends on other freedoms that were absent in the 
Palestinian territories, then we are better able to explain not just the incomplete 
provision of security but also the declining quality of physical security over time. Our 
analysis identified some of the interdependencies in the Palestinian case where the 
Palestinian Authority had a dual character. The merit of the ‘larger freedom’ approach 
is that it allows neutral donors to ask what types of programmes could address 
Palestinian needs without contributing to the downward spiral of legitimacy described 
earlier. Indeed, the development of alternative programmes may be important for 
creating the conditions for a reconstruction and revitalization of Palestinian politics 
and society in the longer term.  
 
Figure 5 shows how the three interdependent aspects of larger freedom can lead us to 
a series of alternative policy priorities for the Palestinian territories. By looking for 
the conditions that need to be met for progress on each of these freedoms we can 
begin to identify a range of issues to which Palestinian civil society and the 
international community needs to give attention in the current context. Even the 
question of freedom from want is no longer unproblematic given the stalled nature of 
the peace process and the possibility that there is no viable Palestinian state just 
around the corner. If so, freedom from want requires the development and 
implementation of strategies appropriate for an indefinite transition period.  
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Development as the achievement of ‘Larger Freedom’: 
Requires progress on three interlinked aspects of Human Security
Freedom 
from fear
Freedom to 
live in dignity
Economic 
development 
insufficient: coping 
strategies for the 
indefinite transition
Freedom 
from want
Aid flows 
insufficient: 
recognize and protect civil 
and political rights during 
indefinite transition
Policing 
capabilities insufficient: 
political dialogue to define 
credible, legitimate  
liberation strategies
 
Figure 5 In Larger Freedom and an Alternative Palestinian Agenda 
 
The interdependence shown in Figure 5 suggests that perhaps these economic goals 
can only be implemented if there is freedom from fear. But freedom from fear has to 
be appropriately understood given the nature of the indefinite transition in Palestine. 
A focus on policing as a way of addressing the freedom from fear may have made 
sense if a sovereign Palestinian state were soon to be set up. Without that happening, 
an exclusive focus on policing had the effect of fragmenting the Palestinian polity and 
contributed to the delegitimization of its leadership. Freedom from fear in the current 
transition requires alternative strategies to encourage Palestinians to engage in internal 
political dialogue and debate to re-establish legitimate political and social goals. This, 
rather than policing, may be the most pressing need to prevent the further 
fragmentation of the Palestinian polity and a possible descent into civil war. 
 
Finally, both the freedom from want and the freedom from fear depend on credible 
strategies for achieving the freedom to live in dignity, which is another way of posing 
the issue of legitimacy. The Palestinian Authority could not in the end sustain the 
legitimacy of its leadership because it was encouraged to focus on capabilities that 
failed to deliver dignity to the Palestinian people. Since dignity through sovereignty 
and independence is not immediately available to the Palestinian people, strategies for 
assuring tolerable levels of dignity during the transition have to be considered. Here 
the protection of the civil and political rights of the Palestinians as a people under 
occupation has to be given the highest priority.  
  
 
Freedom from Want: Reshaping the Economic Agenda  
An important implication of our analysis of indefinite transition is that each of the 
critical freedoms identified in Figure 5 have to be addressed in new ways. The 
freedom from want has traditionally been addressed through strategies of accelerating 
economic development and ensuring a fair distribution of the benefits of growth. 
However, simply developing economic capabilities in territories where closures can 
be enforced at short notice by an external power is a new type of challenge. 
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Traditional industry and agriculture require stable access to inputs and markets. 
Production can suddenly collapse and entrepreneurs can face crippling losses in an 
economy subject to containment. This has been a particular problem for Gaza during 
the blockade which began in 2007, but also affects large parts of the West Bank where 
the barrier has isolated Palestinian population pockets in a semi-permanent way. 
 
The challenge is to supplement existing strategies with a much more effective 
promotion of local economic self-sufficiency together with effective mechanisms for 
rapidly delivering relief and supplies to large populations in isolated pockets who may 
be suddenly cut off. It would not have been rational to prioritize such strategies if the 
conflict economy was likely to be short-lived. But in the context of the Palestinian 
transition, these strategies should not only be prioritized, it is likely that many 
Palestinians will remain reliant on these alternative strategies for a long time. The 
success of such strategies requires in turn the appropriate development of governance 
and delivery capabilities linked to administrative structures.  
 
The capabilities of the Palestinian Authority have been influenced by external 
concerns that control over resources within the Authority should remain with a 
leadership perceived to be more flexible in peace-making. But if the transition is 
likely to last for a long period, the delivery of survival requirements has to be de-
linked from the politics of Oslo and institutional arrangements established to ensure 
that the right of the Palestinian people to enjoy freedom from want are protected. If 
these rights cannot be assured through the structures of the Palestinian Authority then 
permanent alternative structures of delivery need to be urgently considered. This is 
clearly of great urgency in the Gaza Strip but also in many parts of the West Bank. 
The continued politicization of resource flows into the occupied territories not only 
violates the rights of the Palestinian people, paradoxically it further delegitimizes the 
mainstream leadership in the ways discussed earlier because the Oslo route has not 
led and is unlikely to lead to a sovereign Palestinian state in the immediate future. 
 
Alternative strategies need to complement and not supplant traditional economic 
strategies and bureaucratic-technical capabilities of the Authority that have been 
promoted on the basis of development models appropriate for a state in a normal 
economy. For instance, the development of infrastructure to support a normal 
economy, or the development of an export-oriented agriculture still have a role, but 
the history of closures and asymmetric containment shows that these strategies cannot 
be exclusively relied on in the Palestinian context. Indeed, Israel’s capacity to destroy 
Palestinian infrastructure has been powerfully established many times after 2000 and 
Israeli border controls means that trade links can be disrupted with little notice. The 
challenge here is to develop long-term institutional responses for ensuring the 
freedom from want in the specific circumstances of the indefinite transition that 
Palestinian society finds itself in (UNCTAD 2006).  
 
Freedom from Fear: The Importance of Credible Liberation Strategies  
The narrow interpretation of security that dominated Palestinian capacity building 
during the Oslo period arguably had very damaging consequences for the Palestinian 
polity and for the legitimacy of its state-building process. Yet freedom from fear is an 
important requirement for tolerable human life in all situations, including that of 
occupation and indefinite transition. The only important observation is that making 
progress in meeting this condition requires strategies that are appropriate to the 
 30
context. If the Palestinians were close to achieving a sovereign state, and if the state-
building project had wide legitimacy, security capabilities may well have been part of 
the critical capabilities the emerging state needed to acquire to sustain its legitimacy. 
However, in the stalemate context of Oslo, the focus on security led as we have seen 
to a vicious cycle of declining legitimacy and eventually greater internecine violence 
within the Palestinian polity.  
 
Of course the most important source of fear and insecurity for Palestinians is the 
occupation and the hugely asymmetric Israeli attacks on densely populated Palestinian 
centres. Often these attacks are provoked by ill-conceived acts of resistance by 
Palestinians. These in turn are arguably the result of the absence of credible national 
liberation strategies on the part of the mainstream leadership which ordinary 
Palestinians find credible. This is why security for the Palestinians in the interim 
period is deeply connected with the Palestinian leadership being able to establish a 
credible strategy of liberation. In addition, an important threat to Palestinian security 
now comes from the collapse of the legitimate Palestinian national leadership as the 
inclusive and therefore the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian liberation 
movement. While the PLO leadership is still by far the dominant Palestinian 
grouping, the participation of the PLO within the occupied territories in the Oslo 
process clearly affected its popularity relative to that of opposing factions like Hamas 
and other radical groups. Freedom from fear now also requires addressing the threat 
of a Palestinian civil war. At the very least, this requires all Palestinian opinions being 
able to express themselves without fear in attempting to reach a new Palestinian 
consensus about the legitimate goals of the liberation struggle and the strategies 
through which these goals should be pursued.  
 
Some important initiatives show the direction in which Palestinian society and politics 
is likely to move, and external assistance could greatly assist these hopeful initiatives. 
The importance of radically rethinking the core strategies that have informed the 
Palestinian liberation movement has recently been recognized by Palestinian strategic 
thinkers in the Palestine Strategy Study Group including participants from diverse 
Palestinian factions and groups (Palestine Strategy Study Group 2008). An important 
consensus emerging in workshops organized by the Group was that the peace-making 
and state-building discourses initiated by Oslo failed in terms of achieving Palestinian 
national goals. Nor have sporadic acts of violent resistance helped. As the Palestinian 
Strategy Study Group (2008) and others have pointed out, Palestinians actually have 
important alternative sources of bargaining power, including in particular their 
demographic weight. Palestinians have arguably not used these alternative sources of 
bargaining power very effectively. If they did, sporadic and ineffectual acts of 
violence may gradually disappear as more effective credible threats using for instance 
civil rights movements to challenge the continuation of occupation are established.  
 
It is significant that the European Union supported the workshops and meetings that 
led to the Palestinian Strategy Study Group report. Neutral externals who accept the 
legitimacy of Palestinian aspirations for liberation should recognize the importance of 
supporting Palestinian attempts like the Study Group initiatives as vital elements for 
re-establishing a united, credible and legitimate Palestinian strategy for liberation. The 
freedom from fear for Palestinians depends on their leaders and strategic thinkers 
coming up with strategies of liberation that attract both popular support from within 
the Palestinian people (thereby avoiding the risk of civil war) as well as being credible 
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strategies of liberation (thereby reducing desperate acts of resistance by Palestinians 
and asymmetric Israeli responses). Clearly in the vicious cycle of failure that Palestine 
finds itself in, a reliance on policing and security in the traditional narrow sense is not 
going to achieve freedom from fear for the Palestinians, or even for the Israelis 
occasionally facing violent Palestinian resistance.  
 
Freedom to Live in Dignity: Prioritizing Civil and Political Rights 
A life with dignity requires formal or informal protections of vital political, civil and 
human rights that prevent injustice from reaching unacceptable levels. In the 
Palestinian case, as in many other cases of occupation, the freedom to live in dignity 
is most palpably absent. Indeed, many of the mechanisms through which Israel 
maintains its asymmetric containment, such as checkpoints, house searches and 
demolitions, body searches, exclusion of Palestinians from designated roads and areas 
within their territories, and so on, result deliberately or inadvertently in the daily 
humiliation of many Palestinians. In general, the relationship between formal political 
and civil rights and economic performance is not straightforward, particularly in 
developing countries. The absence of formal political rights does not mean that in 
every case the level of oppression will be such that the economy becomes unviable or 
the legitimacy of the state collapses. But in cases where there is occupation and 
national subjugation, the relationship between political rights and other freedoms is 
much more straightforward.  
 
The freedom to live in dignity is probably the most important freedom for a 
population under occupation because the failure to recognize this right could result in 
all other initiatives becoming illegitimate over time. Arguably, the failure of the Oslo 
process to demonstrate how the freedom to live in dignity was to be achieved was a 
major source of its declining legitimacy within the Palestinian population. The donors 
pumped in very large quantities of aid during the Oslo period but aid is not a 
substitute for dignity. Indeed, the experience of Oslo is a powerful demonstration of 
the interdependence of the freedoms outlined in Figure 5. A number of political rights 
are at issue here. The discourse around Oslo put the cart before the horse in significant 
areas and thereby ignored the fact that significant prior rights were missing that made 
the discourse around state-building and security lose legitimacy over time. 
 
Between 1967 and 1993-5 when the Oslo Accords were signed, the Palestinians in the 
occupied territories were clearly a subject population with inferior rights compared to 
Israeli citizens. They did not have the same civil rights or political rights as Israeli 
citizens, and they were technically a subject population for whose safety and security 
Israel was directly and solely responsible under international law. The freedom to live 
in dignity could have been expressed at that time through rights-based campaigns that 
could have proceeded in two directions, not necessarily mutually exclusive. First, in 
the interim period, there could have been a Palestinian campaign for civil and political 
rights for a subject population for whose safety and security the Israeli state was 
responsible. Secondly, the Palestinians could campaign for the right of self-
determination as a political right of a subject population. Both types of civil and 
political rights could have been the subject of democratic mass organizations involved 
in the types of civil rights campaigns that are well known internationally.  
 
The Oslo process bypassed these possibilities of mobilization by assuming that there 
was a clear and effective strategy for achieving Palestinian self-determination that did 
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not require popular mobilization. It also assumed that there was no need to press 
Israel to recognize the fundamental civil and political rights of the subject population 
since occupation was soon to end. The outcome was that self-determination was not 
achieved fifteen years later, while the pressure on Israel to accept responsibility for 
the subject population was seriously diluted. Even the costs of Israeli occupation are 
now largely borne by the international community and taxpayers. The discourse on 
the political and civil rights of the Palestinian population who are still under 
occupation has effectively disappeared. Instead, Oslo has substituted for this a false 
discourse between Israel and the Palestinian Authority treated as a state about how 
each ‘state’ is to guarantee the right to security of the other. This discourse is false 
because only a sovereign state can be asked to effectively protect the security of 
anyone, let alone that of another country. The Palestinian Authority as a self-
governing non-sovereign entity is effectively being asked to assist in the protection of 
the Israeli occupation while the rights of the Palestinian people do not find expression 
in any forum or civil rights movement. This situation must clearly end in the interests 
of all concerned.  
 
If there is no Palestinian state just around the corner, the importance of a Palestinian 
civil rights movement expressing the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people to 
live in dignity has reappeared with great urgency. Again, international partners need 
to understand that the absence of significant Palestinian voices in this area is a matter 
of concern because it diverts Palestinian frustration with humiliation into acts of 
sporadic and desperate violence. The absence of this Palestinian discourse is also not 
accidental but rather a direct and systemic result of a particular peace-making process 
that has reached a dead end, at least for the time being, for the reasons discussed 
earlier. Encouraging a Palestinian civil rights movement is of course a task primarily 
for Palestinians but externals can assist by recognizing that this task is urgent and is 
not something that can be entrusted to the existing leaderships of different factions 
whose reputations and power bases are based on support for or violent opposition to 
the Oslo process. The discourse on rights, whether for the protection of political and 
civil rights of a subject population or the mobilization of support for self-
determination through mass civil movements has to be re-invented given that Oslo 
jumped ahead and blocked these discussions for fifteen years.  
 
The interdependence of these processes with the other freedoms underpinning ‘larger 
freedom’ is clear. A Palestinian civil rights movement with broad popular support and 
legitimacy is not only a mechanism for promoting the freedom to live in dignity, it is 
the most powerful way of underpinning new strategies of political legitimization and 
strategy building which underpin the freedom from fear. And given that the access of 
the Palestinian population to emergency relief during blockades and encirclements 
will be resisted by Israel, the freedom from want during the transition also needs to be 
underpinned by the protection of the political, civil and human rights to which all 
human beings are entitled.  
 
But we also have to recognize that these goals will not be achieved quickly. It will 
take time and diligence to develop an alternative agenda. The temptation is therefore 
to stick to the existing patterns of negotiation. But Palestinians and the external 
powers seeking a lasting political settlement in the region also need to recognize that 
the Palestinians cannot at the moment deploy any significant strategic bargaining 
power that will yield a Palestinian state that has the characteristics of minimal 
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legitimacy. As a result, hopes that yet another push from the US administration will 
result in the rapid creation of a viable Palestinian state go against the experience of 
the last fifteen years, when in addition both the Palestinians and the Israelis had 
significantly greater internal consensus behind ‘land-for-peace’. On the Palestinian 
side, even a unified and legitimate leadership has disappeared. All the indications are 
that the current interim period is likely to be long, years and not months, and possibly 
many years. The only responsible response is to plan for the most likely outcome and 
not the most optimistic and hopeful one which is contradicted by all the available 
evidence. The irony is that by allowing legitimate discussion only about the most 
optimistic but least realistic outcome, significant damage has been done to the 
chances of a viable and lasting peace. 
 
Outline of Key Conclusions  
The Oslo process to Palestinian state formation had a number of internal structural 
flaws that proved to be severely damaging. Not only did this process fail to create a 
viable Palestinian state, it resulted in the unleashing of a vicious cycle of diminishing 
legitimacy and effectiveness of the mainstream secular Palestinian leadership that has 
already had significant negative effects on the integrity of the Palestinian polity and 
its society. The main points in our argument are as follows: 
 
i) The Oslo process could only have resulted in the emergence of a viable Palestinian 
state if three sets of interdependent assumptions about Israeli strategic objectives, 
Palestinian capacity building priorities and the role of donors were consistent and 
aligned towards that outcome. These assumptions turned out not to be true, and in 
particular a significant body of evidence now shows that Israeli strategic objectives 
are not aligned with the rapid emergence of a sovereign Palestinian state. 
 
ii) Given the underlying structural flaws, the insistence by external powers and 
through them the major donors to persuade Palestinian leaders to accept the 
assumptions of Oslo and focus on associated capacity-building programmes was a 
dangerous mistake. This strategy misunderstood the fundamental sources of 
legitimacy both of the Palestinian leadership of the liberation movement and of the 
bureaucratic leadership involved in service delivery through the Palestinian Authority. 
 
iii) The result was a gradual but accelerating collapse of the legitimacy of the 
leadership of the liberation movement and of the Palestinian Authority. To understand 
these processes we need to go back to basics and ask some fundamental questions 
about the meaning of state viability, legitimacy and sovereignty. The dual nature of 
the Palestinian leadership, as leaders of a liberation movement and in charge of 
limited self-government during an interim period accelerated the decline in legitimacy 
and unleashed what we described as a vicious cycle of declining legitimacy and 
effectiveness as Israeli offers on the table diminished in terms of Palestinian 
acceptability. 
 
iv) A fundamental conclusion is that serious damage has been done to the Palestinian 
leadership, and the fragmentation of Palestinian society and its polity has reached 
dangerous proportions. It is time to step back from the precipice and recognize that 
Palestine is currently in a stage that can be best described as indefinite transition. It 
would be highly irresponsible to keep on insisting that the Palestinian leadership 
should continue to negotiate as if a viable Palestinian state is just around the corner. 
 34
 
v) Reconstituting the Palestinian polity and society during this long transition should 
be the priority for Palestinian civil society, external assistance providers and all those 
who seek a lasting peace based on legitimacy. The framework of larger freedoms 
supported by the United Nations allows us to identify the key components of an 
alternative agenda. 
 
vi) If the interim period is likely to be a long one, the economic agenda for assuring 
the freedom from want has to focus on long-term interim coping strategies, the 
development of delivery structures that can rapidly deliver large quantities of 
emergency supplies at short notice and encourage local self-sufficiency wherever 
possible. The freedom from fear has to be based not just on the focus on policing, but 
supplemented by support for serious internal political processes that can assure 
Palestinians that their leadership will adopt credible strategies for achieving national 
liberation. Both these strategies are closely connected to strategies for achieving the 
freedom to live in dignity, which in the context of occupation means bringing back to 
the forefront domestic and international mobilization to support Palestinian political 
and civil rights that put pressure on Israel as the occupying power and enable 
Palestinians to fight credibly for their dignity during a long transition. 
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